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Experimental Approaches in Migration Studies
* 
 
The decision of whether or not to migrate has far-reaching consequences for the lives of 
individuals and their families. But the very nature of this choice makes identifying the impacts 
of migration difficult, since it is hard to measure a credible counterfactual of what the person 
and their household would have been doing had migration not occurred. Migration 
experiments provide a clear and credible way for identifying this counterfactual, and thereby 
allowing causal estimation of the impacts of migration. We provide an overview and critical 
review of the three strands of this approach: policy experiments, natural experiments, and 
researcher-led field experiments. The purpose is to introduce readers to the need for this 
approach, give examples of where it has been applied in practice, and draw out lessons for 
future work in this area. 
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Individuals and households decide whether or not to migrate - and whether or not to send 
remittances if they do migrate - with the outcome of these choices depending upon their skills, 
wealth,  risk  preferences,  ambition,  drive,  family  ties,  and  a  myriad  of  other  observable  and 
unobservable  characteristics.  This  self-selection  of  migrants  poses  a  severe  challenge  for 
researchers  attempting  to  ascertain  the  impacts  of  migration  or  remittances  on  individuals, 
families, and communities. For example, suppose we observe that children are more likely to 
attend school in households with a migrant than in households without a migrant. This may 
reflect  the  income  effect  of  remittances,  but  could  just  as  easily  reflect  that  children  in 
households with migrants have higher quality parental education, or better language skills, or 
that it is parents who care most about the education of their children who migrate to earn the 
money needed to pay for schooling costs. As a result, even if we condition on a wide array of 
observable  characteristics,  comparisons  of  migrants  and  non-migrants  are  unlikely  to  give 
convincing estimates of the impacts of migration. 
Experimental  approaches  to  migration  studies  aim  to  overcome  this  difficulty  by 
exploiting situations where the reason one household engages in migration or remits and another 
does not is truly the result of random chance. This may occur as a result of policy experiments, 
such  as  visa  lotteries;  through  natural  experiments  whereby  ―nature‖  provides  the  source  of 
exogenous variation; and through researcher-led field experiments which are explicitly designed 
to test specific theories of constraints to migration or remittance behavior. The purpose of this 
chapter is to introduce readers to the need for this approach, give examples of where it has been 
applied in practice, and draw out lessons for future work in this area. We begin with a short 
discussion  to  illustrate  the  perils  and  challenges  of  trying  to  estimate  the  causal  impacts  of 
migration  or  remittances  using  non-experimental  approaches,  and  then  discuss  the  different 
experimental approaches, before concluding with lessons for future work. 
 
2. The challenge of assessing the causal impact of migration
1 
  A large part of the development literature in migration attempts to answer questions of 
the form ―what is the effect of migration or remittances on outcome Y?‖. One branch of this 
focuses on the migrants themselves, and is interested in how migration changes their incomes, 
health, stress levels, and life opportunities. A second branch focuses on remaining household 
members and communities in the sending areas, and is interested in the impact of having a 
household member migrate or of receiving remittances on the education and health of children, 
on levels of entrepreneurship and labor supply of adult members, and on poverty and inequality 
levels in the village. A common approach to answering such questions is to use survey data on 
migrants  and  non-migrants,  and  attempt  to  control  for  differences  between  them  in  a  linear 
regression framework.  We will set this out for the case of estimating the impact of migration, 
but the challenge is analogous for estimating the impact of remittances. For example, researchers 
may attempt to estimate an equation of the form: 
i i i i X Migrant Y         '           (1) 
                                                           
1 See McKenzie (2005) and Gibson et al. (2010) for more detail on these challenges. 3 
 
Where Migranti is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the individual is a migrant, and 
zero if he or she is not, Yi is the outcome of interest (e.g. individual income), and Xi are a set of 
observed  characteristics  of  the  individual  which  are  presumed  not  to  have  changed  with 
migration  (e.g.  age,  sex  and  education  level,  location  of  birth,  ethnicity,  religion,  parental 
education, etc.).
2 Then in order for the linear regression estimate of β to give the causal impact of 
migration on the outcome of interest, we require that: 
  0 |  i i i X Migrant E                (2) 
  That is, we require the unobserved determinants of the outcome of interest (income in our 
example)  to  be  uncorrelated  with  whether  or  not  an  individual  migrates  once  we  have 
conditioned  on  the  observable  characteristics  of  these  individuals.  But  in  the  absence  of 
experimental variation in  migration, this  assumption is  unlikely to  hold.  Indeed, the seminal 
migration selectivity model of Borjas (1987) has migrants deciding whether or not to migrate in 
part on the basis of the εi they would expect to have at home versus abroad. It is easy to think of 
a whole range of typically unmeasured variables, such as entrepreneurial prowess, ambition, 
language  proficiency,  and  health  status  which  would  both  affect  whether  or  not  someone 
migrates, and also directly affect their income or other outcome of interest. Likewise liquidity 
constraints will likely determine both the pattern of self-selection of migrants (McKenzie and 
Rapoport,  2010),  as  well  as  the  range  of  job  opportunities  and  consumption-smoothing 
opportunities that individuals will have at home. As a result, equation (2) will almost always be 
violated in practice, so that linear regression on equation (1) will result in biased estimates of the 
impact of migration. 
  Equation (2) therefore says that we can only estimate the causal impact of migration if 
the only reason one person migrates and another does not is random (conditional on observed 
characteristics). That is, ideally we would randomly choose some people to migrate and others 
not to, and then by comparing these two groups, get the impact of migration. This is precisely 
what the experimental approach attempts to do.   
 
3. Examples of the Experimental Approach 
 
3.1. Policy Experiments 
  Several  countries  use visa lotteries to  choose among numerous  applicants  desiring to 
immigrate through a particular migration category that has a fixed quota. The most famous of 
these is the United States Diversity Visa Lottery (commonly known as the Green Card Lottery), 
which  each  year  makes  available  50,000  visas,  to  be  drawn  randomly  among  eligible 
applications from countries with low rates of immigration to the United States. For the 2010 
lottery,  over  13.6  million  qualified  entries  were  received,  with  102,800  applicants  drawn  as 
winners, under the assumption that half of these would migrate.
3  Whilst this is the most well-
known example of a migration lottery, it has not been used for research yet. 
                                                           
2 For simplicity we consider only the case of an individual-level outcome here, assuming that all migrants and non-
migrants are observed. When the comparison involves households with and without migrants, a second form of 
selectivity  is  involved,  since  households  can  also  choose  whether  all  members  migrate,  or  only  some.  Return 
migration  also  introduces  a  third  form  of  selectivity.  See  Gibson  et  al.  (2010)  for  discussion  of  this  more 
complicated case. 
3 Source: http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_4574.html [accessed February 26, 2010]. 4 
 
  Researchers  have  exploited  smaller  lottery  programs.  The  first  such  set  of  studies 
considered the Pacific Access Category program for Tonga, which provides an opportunity for 
250 individuals each year to move to New Zealand, with a random ballot used to select among 
all eligible applications received. McKenzie et al. (2010) collaborated with the New Zealand 
Department of Labour to draw a sample of individuals who had their names selected in this 
ballot, as well as a sample of those who applied but whose names were not drawn. They then 
surveyed the ballot winners in New Zealand, their remaining family members in Tonga, and the 
ballot losers in Tonga. As with the U.S. diversity visa, not all those whose names were chosen in 
the lottery migrated, so the authors also had to survey in Tonga the ballot winners who did not 
migrate. 
  If everyone who applied for the migration lottery ended up migrating, and no one who 
lost the lottery migrated, then linear regression of equation 1 (with or without the X controls) for 
the  sample  of  lottery  applicants,  would  give  a  consistent  estimate  of  the  causal  impact  of 
migration for people who enter the migration lottery program. However, in practice, some of 
those  who  win  the  lottery  may  not  move  (they  may  change  their  mind,  or  fail  an  entry 
requirement), whilst a few of those who lose the lottery may find other ways of migrating. In 
such cases, the outcome of the lottery can be used as an instrumental variable for migration, and 
still be used to identify the impact of migration on the outcome of interest.  If the impact of 
migration varies across individuals (is heterogeneous), then what will be identified is the local 
average treatment effect (LATE). Recently there has been debate as to whether the LATE is a 
parameter of interest in many experiments (e.g. Deaton, 2010 and Imbens, 2010). However, in 
the case of a migration lottery, it is easy to argue that the parameter is giving an effect of policy 
interest. The LATE tells us the impact of migrating for someone who would migrate if they won 
the lottery, and not migrate otherwise. This is precisely what we would be interested in when 
assessing the impacts of such policies on development outcomes. 
  McKenzie et al. (2010) use this migration lottery to estimate that Tongans moving to 
New  Zealand  have  a  263  percent  increase  in  income,  within  the  first  year  of  moving.  The 
migrants also benefit in terms of improved mental health (Stillman et al, 2009). The authors then 
use a sample of non-applicants to the lottery and a large sample of the overall population and 
compare the experimental estimate to what one would obtain using non-experimental methods. 
They  find  that  linear  regression  would  overstate  the  income  gain  to  migration  by  27  to  35 
percent,  which  is  consistent  with  migrants  being  positively  selected  on  unobservables  (the 
authors find positive selection on observables). Using non-experimental methods like difference-
in-differences or propensity score matching reduces this overstatement a little, but still results in 
an  overstatement  of  around  20  percent  in  the  income  gain  from  migration.  The  only  non-
experimental method that gets close to the experimental estimate is a good instrumental variable. 
  Migration policies typically limit which other family members can migrate along with the 
principal migrant, often restricting this just to the spouse and dependent children of the migrant. 
This  policy  rule  can  be  used  alongside  a  migration  lottery  to  deal  with  a  second  form  of 
selectivity – selectivity into which household members move and which remain in the home 
country. Gibson et al. (2009) use the combination of the policy rule and the lottery to look at the 
impact of migration on remaining household members in Tonga, finding evidence that remaining 
household  members  appear  worse  off  in  the  short-term,  with  lower  per  capita  incomes  and 
consumption.  5 
 
  The above studies relied on the use of administrative data to track winners and losers in 
the Pacific Access Category.  It requires  considerable effort and enlightened policymakers in 
order for researchers to obtain access to such data. An alternative approach would be to attempt 
to locate households with lottery winners and losers in a survey in the migrant-sending country. 
Gibson  et  al.  (2010)  provide  an  example  of  this  approach,  using  a  representative  survey  of 
Samoan  households  to  identify  households  which  entered  the  Samoan  Quota  lottery,  which 
allows 1,100 Samoans to migrate to New Zealand each year. Since Samoa’s population is small, 
the lottery had been in place for several years, and there were 5,000-7,000 applications for the 
lottery each year, a random sample of households was able to identify sufficient numbers of 
lottery winners and losers for experimental analysis  of the impact  of migration through this 
category.  In  contrast  to the Tongan results,  the Samoan experiment  finds  migration to  have 
reduced  poverty  and  increased  household  incomes  among  remaining  household  members. 
However,  there  is  suggestive  evidence  that  this  positive  effect  may  be  short-lived,  with 
remittances and home production falling with time spent abroad of migrant members.   
  Clemens (2010) provides a final example of the use of a lottery provided by migration 
policy. He studies the H1-B visa, which is an admission channel for high skilled workers who 
wish to work in the United States. There is a cap on the number of people who can annually enter 
through this category, and while applications are processed on a first-come, first-served basis, in 
2007 and 2008 so many applications were received on the opening days, that a lottery was used 
to select which applications to process. Rather than trying to get administrative data from the 
United  States  Citizenship  and  Immigration  Services,  which  would  be  incredibly  difficult, 
Clemens obtained personnel records from a large Indian information technology/software firm 
that supplied a large number of applicants to this lottery. He is then able to use these records to 
determine the impact of migrating on the migration, job title, and earnings of the applicants in 
this Indian firm. 
  An  underlying  assumption  of  the  experimental  estimates  is  that  the  migration  lottery 
influences the outcome of interest for an individual only through that individual’s migration 
decision. In particular, we require the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (Rubin, 1986), 
which means that the outcome of one individual should not be affected by the lottery outcome of 
another  individual.  Thus  when  we  consider  the  case  of  measuring  the  income  gain  from 
migration, we would require that the income of lottery losers is not affected by whether other 
people in the sample win or lose the lottery. One potential way this assumption could be violated 
would be if the lottery winners send remittances to the lottery loser households. This is unlikely 
to be much of an issue in cases where the number of winners is small relative to the overall 
population, and can be directly checked through surveys. A more problematic concern would be 
if the employment prospects of the lottery losers change as a result of the winners migrating. 
Whilst  there  is  some  evidence  to  suggest  that  large-scale  migration  can  increase  the  wages 
earned by non-migrants through less competition for jobs (Mishra, 2007), this is again likely to 
be at most a second-order concern when the number of winners is small relative to the overall 
population. But it is more of a concern in cases like that studied by Clemens (2010), where the 
entrants studied are all from the same company, and it is therefore harder to imagine that the job 
opportunities available to the non-migrants are not affected by having some company members 
abroad. 6 
 
  In addition to the lotteries discussed, the U.S. has had a lottery for Cubans in the mid 
1990s
4, New Zealand’s Pacific Access Category also has small lotteries for Kiribati and Tuvalu, 
and New Zealand also used a lottery to allocate places in its Family Quota and Refugee Family 
Quota Categories in the early 2000s.
5 Currently only a few studies to date have utilized migration 
policy  experiments.  However,  given  the  massive  excess  demand  for  migration  into  many 
countries worldwide, a lottery system for choosing which applications to proc ess provides one 
fair and equitable mechanism for countries to process such applications, and we see this as a rich 
area for both researchers and policymakers to work on in the future. 
 
3.2. Natural Experiments 
 
  In  addition  to  exogenous  variation  generated  by  government  policy,  identification  of 
causal  effects  in  migration  research  can  also  take  advantage  of  other  sources  of  exogenous 
variation in right-hand-side variables of interest, or so-called natural experiments. We review 
here recent studies that take advantage of two types of natural experiments: exchange rate shocks 
experienced by migrants, and weather shocks to which migrants’ origin households are exposed 
in the home country. 
 
Impacts of changes in migrants’ economic conditions 
  A question of general interest in migration studies is ―What is the impact of changes in a 
migrant’s economic conditions on outcomes in  their origin household?‖ Such questions help 
reveal the extent to which changes in migration host countries (such as economic conditions, 
exchange rates, job opportunities, restrictions on legal work, etc.) affect a migrant’s willingness 
and ability to send resources home, as well as the ways in which migrant resources are used by 
recipient households. Impacts can be mediated by several channels, such as remittances sent 
home, the stock of savings held by migrants overseas, or return migration decisions.  
A central difficulty in answering this type of question is that migrant earnings or migrant 
economic conditions more generally are in general not randomly allocated, so that any observed 
relationship between migrant economic conditions and household outcomes may simply reflect 
the influence of unobserved third factors. For example, more ambitious households could have 
migrants who work for higher wages or in destinations with more attractive work opportunities, 
and  also  have  higher  entrepreneurial  investment  levels  in  the  origin  household.  Alternately, 
households that recently experienced an adverse shock to existing investments (say, the failure of 
a small business) might send members overseas to make up lost income, and when migration 
decisions are made under duress migrants may accept going to less-attractive destinations. In 
sum, simply observing a statistical correlation between migrant economic conditions overseas 
and outcomes in migrant origin households does not imply that migrant economic conditions 
cause the origin household outcomes in question.  
An experimental approach to establishing the impact of migrant economic opportunities 
on household outcomes could start by identifying a set of households that already had one or 
                                                           
4 http://havana.usint.gov/media/pdfs/lottery.pdf [accessed March 1, 2010]. 
5 These categories have now been replaced, but New Zealand still uses a random ballot to fill residual places in its 
Refugee Family Support Category which provides a means for refugees to spons or parents, adult siblings or 
grandparents into New Zealand. 7 
 
more members working overseas, assigning each migrant a randomly-sized economic shock, and 
then examining the relationship between changes in household outcomes and the size of the 
shock dealt to the household’s migrants. 
Yang and Martinez (2005) and Yang  (2008b) take advantage of a real-world  natural 
experiment  that  is  analogous  to  the  experiment  just  described.  Many  households  in  the 
Philippines  have one or more members working overseas.  These overseas  Filipinos  work in 
dozens of foreign countries, many of which experienced sudden changes in exchange rates due to 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Crucially for the analysis, the changes were unexpected and 
varied in magnitude across overseas Filipinos’ locations. The net result was large variation in the 
size of the exchange rate shock experienced by migrants across source households. Between the 
year ending July 1997 and the year ending October 1998, the US dollar and currencies in the 
main Middle Eastern destinations of Filipino workers rose 50% in value against the Philippine 
peso. Over the same time period, by contrast, the currencies of Taiwan, Singapore, and Japan 
rose by only 26%, 29%, and 32%, while those of Malaysia and Korea actually fell slightly (by 
1% and 4%, respectively) against the peso. 
Taking advantage of this variation in the size of migrant exchange rate shocks, these 
papers examine the impact of the shocks on changes in outcomes in migrants’ origin households, 
using detailed panel household survey data from before and after the Asian financial crisis. 
Yang  (2008b)  shows  that  these  exogenous  increases  in  migrant  resources  are  used 
primarily for investment in origin households, rather than for current consumption. Households 
experiencing more favorable exchange rate shocks see greater increases in child schooling and 
reductions  child  labor  (for  children  aged  10-17).  They  also  raise  their  non-consumption 
expenditures  in  several  areas  likely  to  be  investment-related  (in  particular  in  educational 
expenditures), and show enhanced entrepreneurship participation in entrepreneurial activities. 
Households raise hours worked in self-employment, and become more likely to start relatively 
capital-intensive  household  enterprises  (transportation/communication  services  and 
manufacturing). By contrast, there is no large or statistically significant effect of the exchange 
rate shocks on current household consumption. Yang and Martinez (2005) extends the analysis 
and shows that these positive migrant exchange rate shocks also lead these households to be 
more likely to exit poverty status. 
Aside from impacts on migrant origin households, it is also of interest to examine how 
migrant return decisions changed in response to the exchange rate shocks accompanying the 
Asian financial crisis. In research on migration decision-making, a current debate is whether 
durations  of  migrants’  stays  overseas  are  determined  primarily  by  straightforward  life-cycle 
considerations, as opposed to being driven by the need to reach target-earnings levels. By ―life-
cycle‖ considerations, one means simply that households choose the length of stay overseas that 
balances  the  marginal  benefit  from  higher  savings  overseas  (and  thus  higher  lifetime 
consumption) against the marginal utility cost of overseas work (as in Stark, Helmenstein, and 
Yegorov (1997) and Dustmann (2003)). On the other hand, when households face borrowing 
constraints and minimum investment levels, lengths of stay overseas can be determined by the 
amount of time needed to accumulate a ―target-earnings‖ level, as in Piore (1979) and Mesnard 
(2004). 
Distinguishing between the two alternative motivations for return migration is important, 
because  the  return  decisions  of  ―life-cycle‖  migrants  and  ―target-earners‖  can  respond  very 
differently  to  changes  in  overseas  economic  conditions.  For  ―life-cycle‖  migrants,  improved 8 
 
economic conditions in host countries—say, increased wages—can lead to longer overseas stays 
(as long as substitution effects dominate any income effects). For ―target-earners,‖ on the other 
hand, improved economic conditions should lead to shorter overseas stays, as migrants reach 
their earnings goals more quickly. 
Empirically, attempts to distinguish between the two alternatives typically examine the 
correlation between return migration and migrants’ overseas earnings. The evidence has been 
inconclusive. Borjas (1989) finds among the foreign-born in the US that higher earnings are 
associated  with  less  return  migration.  By  contrast,  Dustmann  (2003)  documents,  among 
immigrants in Germany, that higher migrant wages (instrumented by parental education) are 
associated with more return migration (shorter overseas stays). Constant and Massey (2002) find 
no statistically significant relationship between earnings and migrant returns in the same German 
dataset,  although  migrants  who  are  unemployed  or  marginally  employed  are  more  likely  to 
return. 
A  key  methodological  concern with  existing empirical  work on this  topic is  that the 
independent variable of interest—foreign earnings—is not randomly assigned across migrants, 
so  any  observed  relationship  between  foreign  earnings  and  return  migration  may  simply  be 
caused by unobserved third factors. For example, a finding that migrants with higher earnings 
have shorter lengths of stay overseas need not imply that higher earnings cause shorter migration 
durations. Rather, higher-wage migrants could simply have other characteristics that make early 
return attractive (such as better job prospects at home, or stronger family ties). 
Yang  (2006)  exploits  the  exchange  rate  shocks  experienced  by  Filipino  overseas 
migrants, making possible a causal estimate of the effect of migrant economic conditions on 
return migration. In so doing, it also sheds light on the relative importance of life-cycle versus 
target-earnings explanations for return migration. Overall, the paper finds that more favorable 
exchange rate shocks lead to fewer migrant returns, which supports the ―life-cycle‖ explanation 
for  return  migration.  A  positive  exchange  rate  shock  raises  the  marginal  benefit  of  staying 
overseas  (by raising the domestic-currency value of foreign wages), and leads to less return 
migration  on  the  margin.  However,  the  paper  also  finds  that  even  though  life-cycle 
considerations seem to dominate on the whole, migrants from a subset of households appear to 
be  target-earners.  In  households  with  intermediate  values  of  the  foreign  wage  index,  the 
exchange rate shocks lead to increases in variables associated with household investment, such 
as vehicle or real estate purchases and entrepreneurial income. These results are consistent with 
the  theoretical  prediction  that  the  migrants  most  likely  to  be  target-earners  are  those  in  the 
middle of the foreign wage distribution: positive exchange rate shocks make target-earners more 
likely  to  return  home  and  to  invest  (because  they  become  more  likely  to  have  reached  the 
minimum investment threshold). 
The general methodology used in these studies on Philippine migrants – examining the 
impact of an economic shock experienced by overseas migrants on remittances and the outcomes 
of family members left behind – can potentially be applied in a variety of different contexts. 
Studies  using  a  similar  methodology  can  be  useful  to  ascertain  whether  the  results  in  the 
Philippine case extend to other contexts, or, if not, what might account for the differences in 
impacts.  
The key requirements for such as study are: 1) an origin country whose migrants are 
destined to a wide variety of overseas destinations, 2) large and heterogeneous economic shocks 
in destination areas, 3) data on migrant locations before the shocks, and 4) data on migrant and 9 
 
origin household outcomes after the shocks.  Many situations satisfy  elements 1) and 2):  for 
example, migrants from India and the other countries of South Asia also are destined for a wide 
variety of overseas destinations, and regional or global country-level economic shocks (such as 
the  2008-09  global  financial  crisis)  are  often  heterogeneous  in  magnitude  across  migrant 
destinations. Migrants from specific countries in Latin America are often destined for a variety 
of locations across the United States, and hence it can be possible to exploit state-level (and 
perhaps occupation- or industry-specific) economic shocks experienced by migrants to achieve 
identification. Antman (2010) provides one example of this approach. 
A likely hindrance to future research along these lines among other migrant populations 
is that there are fewer situations where the requisite survey data (requirements 3 and 4) are 
available. The Philippine case is unusual, in that the National Statistics Office of the Philippines 
administers a linked set of high-quality surveys to a nationally-representative household sample 
that includes a detailed module on migration which is administered if the household reports 
having one or more members overseas. Importantly, the migration module (called the Survey on 
Overseas Filipinos) includes questions on migration history that allows a researcher to track 
migration episodes up to 5 years in the past. Such a module turns out to be crucial for identifying 
households that had migrants in specific shock-exposed locations prior to the shock, because 
location after the shock could be endogenous and therefore introduce bias in estimation. A key 
implication for surveys of migrant sending households in countries where migrants tend to only 
go to a one or a few main destinations is to collect information not only on which country the 
migrant is in, but also the city or region to provide more scope for identifying local shocks. 
 
Remittance responses to conditions in migrant origin areas 
An important potential benefit from international migration is that remittances may serve 
as  insurance,  rising  in  the  wake  of  negative  shocks  in  migrants’  home  countries.  Rural 
households  in  many  developing  countries  are  highly  exposed  to  weather  risk,  experiencing 
storms, flooding, and droughts with great frequency. Households therefore should benefit greatly 
from access to formal and informal insurance that alleviates their most important sources of 
weather risk. Potential benefits include the ability to maintain nutritional, health, and educational 
investments, to adopt new production technologies, and to start new entrepreneurial activities 
that weather risk made previously unattractive. A large literature has examined the mechanisms 
through which households cope with risk in developing countries, but until recently the insurance 
role of remittances has not been investigated. 
Yang and Choi (2007) and Yang (2008a) explore whether migrant remittances serve as 
insurance in the wake of negative weather shocks. This is a mechanism for coping with shocks 
ex post on which previous micro-level studies have not focused. At the international level, it is 
commonly posited that remittance flows from overseas buffer economic shocks in the migrants’ 
home countries (for example, Ratha 2003), but there have been relatively few empirical tests of 
this claim with micro-level household data. Mishra (2005) examines remittances in 13 Caribbean 
countries from 1980 to 2002 and finds that every 1 percent decrease in GDP is associated with a 
3  percent  increase  in  remittances  two  years  later.  Related  research  on  the  role  of  internal 
(domestic) migration in pooling risk within extended families includes Lucas and Stark (1985), 
Rosenzweig and Stark (1989), and Paulson (2003). 
Yang and Choi (2007) and Yang (2008a) emphasize credible identification of the effect 
of negative shocks on international remittances. Existing studies of the impact of household 10 
 
income on remittance receipts use cross-sectional data, and so are subject to potentially severe 
biases  in  directions  that  are  not  obvious  a  priori.  Reverse  causation  is  a  major  concern: 
productive investments funded by migrant remittances can raise household income, leading to 
positive correlations between household income and remittances. Alternately, remittances may 
reduce households' need to find alternative income sources, leading to a negative relationship 
between remittances and domestic-source income. Even if reverse causation from remittances to 
income in migrants' source households was not a problem, it would be difficult to separate the 
cross-sectional relationship between income and remittances from the influence of unobserved 
third factors affecting both income and remittances (for example, the entrepreneurial spirit of 
household members). 
Yang  and  Choi  (2007)  resolve  these  identification  problems  by  focusing  on  income 
changes  for  the  migrant-sending  family  due  to  shocks—changes  in  local  rainfall—that  are 
credibly exogenous, so that bias due to reverse causation is not a concern. Among households in 
the Philippines with members who are overseas migrants, they find that changes in income from 
domestic sources lead to changes in remittances in the opposite direction of the income change: 
remittances fall when income rises, and remittances rise when income falls. In such households, 
the amount of insurance is large: roughly 60% of exogenous declines in income are replaced by 
remittance inflows from overseas. In a similar vein, Clarke and Wallsten (2004) find, using panel 
data from Jamaica, that remittances from overseas replaced 25% of damages from Hurricane 
Gilbert in 1992. Yang (2008a) examines the impact of hurricanes on international financial flows 
using country-level panel data and finds that, for the poorest developing countries, hurricane 
damage  leads  to  large  inflows  of  migrants’  remittances,  amounting  to  20%  of  experienced 
damages.  Strikingly,  the  remittance  response  to  hurricanes  for  these  countries  is  large  in 
magnitude: roughly one-quarter as large as the response of foreign aid. 
 
General thoughts on natural experiments 
As these examples show, natural experiments offer the potential to provide a credible 
means of helping answer many important questions in migration studies. However, there are 
often  clear  limits  to  the  types  of  questions  such  natural  experiments  can  answer  (see  also 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000) and one needs to be cautious in interpreting the results. For 
example, work such as that by Yang (2008b) directly looks at the impact of the exchange rate 
shocks on outcomes for migrant sending households. This does not reveal the average impact of 
remittances or of migration, but rather the response of these sending households to temporary 
shocks in the earnings their migrants earn abroad. A finding that households save or invest much 
of the additional amount remitted as a result should therefore not be used to infer that remittances 
in general are used for largely productive purposes – economic theory tells us we should expect 
households  to  save  or  invest  more  in  response  to  temporary  income  shocks  and  temporary 
increases  in  remittances  caused  by  exchange  rate  fluctuations  than  they  would  from  regular 
income or their usual level of remittances.  
This is not a concern for the Yang (2008b) study in which the question of interest is 
indeed the response of migrant households to temporary shocks in the conditions facing their 
migrants abroad. But it is a more of a concern for studies which attempt to use these natural 
experiments  to  generate  an  instrumental  variable  for  migration  or  remittances.  When  these 
natural experiments are used to instrument migration, the impact identified is the local average 
treatment  effect  for  households  affected  by  the  instrument.  For  example,  Antman  (2010) 11 
 
instruments father’s migration with economic conditions in the main U.S. destinations in a study 
of the impact of paternal migration on child schooling. Assuming the instrument meets the other 
criteria required, the effect identified is only the impact of parental migration for children whose 
father’s migration decisions are affected by temporary economic shocks in the U.S. destinations. 
Given the large income differences between Mexico and the U.S., the set of households likely to 
have their migration decisions change as a result of these temporary shocks may be small, and 
thus the impact identified not be one that applies to much of the overall migrant population. 
  An important warning about natural experiments is that they must be scrutinized carefully 
before  they  are  used  as  instruments  in  instrumental  variables  (IV)  estimation.  When  an 
exogenous  source  of  variation  in  economic  conditions  is  identified  (e.g.,  weather,  exchange 
rates), it is often tempting to take the next step and use the shock as an instrumental variable. The 
concern is with the validity of the  IV exclusion restriction, namely the requirement that the 
instrument  only  affect  the  2
nd-stage  variable  of  interest  via  the  endogenous  right-hand-side 
variable of interest (which is being instrumented).
6 It is actually quite rare for exogenous shocks 
to satisfy the exclusion restriction, because there are usually a number of different channels 
through which the shock can affec t the 2
nd-stage outcome of interest. When this is the case, 
instrumenting  for  just  one  of  several  channels  with  the  shock  will  generally  lead  to  biased 
estimates. That said, it is generally acceptable to examine the ―reduced form‖ effect of the shock 
(e.g., in a regression of the outcome of interest directly on the shock variables), and to interpret 
the effect of the shock as operating through multiple potential channels.  For example, Yang 
(2008b) examines only the reduced form effect of the exchange rate shock on the dependent 
variables of interest precisely because the exchange rate shocks could operate through at least 
two  channels:  through  remittances  sent  home  as  well  through  the  Philippine-peso  value  of 
savings  and  other  assets  held  overseas.  In  this  case  using  the  exchange  rate  shock  as  an 
instrument for remittances would have led to biased estimates. This bias would probably have 
been in an upward direction because any effects of the exchange rate operating via changes in the 
value  of  unremitted  overseas  savings  would  have  been  ―loaded‖  onto  the  coefficient  on 
remittances. 
 
3.3. Field Experiments 
While governments should use them more often, policy experiments are rare. Natural 
experiments, while valuable and revealing when they occur, are difficult to find. When policy or 
natural experiments do not exist, a large set of questions can be answered via randomized control 
trials or field experiments. Well-designed field experiments can help us understand not only the 
impact of a particular program or intervention, but can also shed light on underlying causal 
mechanisms  or  test  particular  theories.  While  field  experiments  have  become  increasingly 
common  in  development  economics  research,  they  have  only  just  begun  to  be  attempted  in 
research on migration.  
  In this section we provide overviews of a handful of recent or ongoing field experiments 
on  migration:  studies  of  savings  among  migrants  in  the  U.S.  and  research  on  barriers  to 
migration  (for  internal  migrations  in  Bangladesh  and  international  migrants  from  the 
Philippines). 
                                                           




Studies of migrant savings  
While remittances bring numerous benefits to households in developing countries, to date 
we know very little about how migrants make their remittance-sending decisions. In particular, it 
is unknown whether migrants desire greater control over how family members back home use 
the remittances they receive. This question is relevant not only for migration studies but also for 
the large and active literature in development economics on intra-household resource allocation. 
What’s more, a better understanding of these questions could have substantial impact on public 
policy, by suggesting policies to further stimulate remittance flows and potentially channel them 
towards more productive uses in migrant source countries. 
Ashraf, Aycinena, Martinez, and Yang (2010), henceforth AAMY, address some of these 
questions via a randomized controlled trial among migrants from El Salvador who are living and 
working in the Washington, D.C. metro area. The research aims to shed light on the extent to 
which migrants’ lack of direct control over the use of remittances affects remittance flows, and 
on the impact of new financial products that could increase migrant control. 
In  particular,  AAMY  focus  on  improving  the  ability  of  migrants  to  ensure  that 
remittances are deposited and accumulated in savings accounts in the home country. In survey 
data collected as part of the study, Washington, D.C.-based migrants from El Salvador report that 
they  would  like  recipient  households  to  save  21.2%  of  remittance  receipts,  while  recipient 
households prefer to save only 2.6% of receipts. Migrants often intend the savings to be for the 
use  of  the  recipient  household  in  the  future,  but  such  savings  also  can  be  intended  for  the 
migrant’s future use.  In the latter case, migrants may send their own funds to be saved in El 
Salvador because they perceive savings held in the U.S. as relatively insecure (particularly for 
undocumented migrants who fear deportation and loss of their assets).  
AAMY designed a field experiment that offered new facilities for Salvadoran migrants to 
directly channel some fraction of their remittances into savings accounts in El Salvador. Savings 
facilities were offered in conjunction with Banco Agricola, El Salvador’s largest bank. To isolate 
the importance of migrant control over savings, AAMY test demand for different products that 
offer migrants varying levels of control. For example, they investigate differential demand for 
savings accounts that must be solely in the name of a remittance recipient in El Salvador, versus 
accounts that are either jointly owned with the migrant or for which the migrant is the sole 
owner.  
The impact evaluation uses a randomized treatment-control methodology. Migrants in the 
study are randomly assigned across treatment conditions, and so comparisons across the various 
treatment conditions reveal the causal impact of offering migrant control on the outcomes of 
interest  (which  include  savings  account  take-up,  savings  balances,  and  remittances).  The 
intervention studied is unusual among development economics field experiments in that it is 
conducted  among  migrants  who  are  located  in  a  developed  country,  while  several  primary 
outcomes  of  interest  (savings)  are  those  of  individuals  who  remain  behind  in  a  developing 
country.  Data  on  activity  at  our  partner  bank  are  available  from  the  bank’s  administrative 
records. Baseline and follow-up surveys administered to both migrants in the U.S. and their 
corresponding remittance-receiving households in El Salvador provide data on a broader set of 
other outcomes. 
AAMY’s  results  provide  evidence  that  a  desire  for  control  over  remittance  uses—in 
particular, control over the extent to which remittances are saved in formal savings accounts—is 13 
 
quantitatively large and has an important influence on financial decision making by migrants. 
Across the experimental conditions  in  the  sample, migrants  were much more likely to  open 
savings accounts when offered the option of greater control over the accounts. What’s more, 
offering greater migrant control over El Salvador-based savings accounts led to higher savings 
accumulation in El Salvador.  
  A related randomized experiment on savings among immigrants was conducted by Chin, 
Karkoviata,  and  Wilcox  (2010).  This  study  examines  the  impact  of  providing  Mexican 
immigrants in the US with assistance obtaining a form of ID (a matricula consular) that can be 
used as identification when opening a US bank account. Study participants were made aware of a 
collaborating US bank that had an ongoing savings promotion among Hispanic immigrants, but 
the matriculas consulares in principle could have been used at any number of US banks. Impacts 
of the treatment were assessed in an in-person follow-up survey. Assignment to the treatment is 
found to lead to increased opening of US bank accounts, higher savings in the US, and reduced 
remittances to Mexico. Among migrants who report they have ―no control‖ over how remittances 
are used in Mexico, the abovementioned effects are larger, and there is also a large, positive and 
statistically significant treatment effect on migrant earnings.  
Taken together with AAMY, the Chin, Karkoviata and Wilcox (2010) study reinforces 
the conclusion that migrants have a variety of types of demand for savings facilities. There is 
demand for savings in the US, as well as demand for savings in the country of origin, and 
providing access to appropriate savings devices can have large impacts on savings. What’s more, 
both studies underline the importance of migrant control over savings accounts in facilitating 
savings accumulation. We view such studies as just the tip of the proverbial iceberg. There is 
likely to be great potential for analogous future studies that partner with institutions to offer a 
variety of financial services to immigrants. Products that have yet to be investigated include 
credit, insurance, and direct payment facilities targeted towards the needs of migrants and their 
origin households. 
 
Identifying barriers to migration 
  While international and internal migration flows are large in magnitude, even greater 
numbers of individuals do not migrate, even in the face of substantial wage differentials between 
less- and more-developed areas. There are likely to be large number of potential migrants who 
are deterred from migrating by a variety of barriers, such as imperfect information on migrant 
wages  and  job  conditions,  imperfect  information  on  one’s  own  affinity  for  or  returns  from 
migrant  work,  lack  of  information  on  job-seeking  procedures,  and  credit  constraints  (when 
migration or job search involves non-negligible fixed costs).  
At  the  moment  we  know  little  as  researchers  about  the  relative  importance  of  these 
various potential barriers to migration. Credible evidence on the importance of migration barriers 
has  important  policy  implications  as  well.  A  number  of  developing  countries  –  most 
prominently,  the  Philippines  –  have  enacted  policies  intended  to  facilitate  and  regulate 
international migration and view such policies as integral components of their overall economic 
development strategies. If there is a desire to promote migration, it is crucial to understand which 
barriers are operative and the impact of interventions that are aimed at reducing these barriers. 
While no study has been completed so far, randomized control trials in Bangladesh and the 
Philippines are currently underway and seek to shed light on the relative importance of several 
potential barriers to migration. 14 
 
Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak (2010) are currently analyzing the results of an ongoing 
randomized field experiment in the northwestern region of Rangpur in Bangladesh. A relatively 
impoverished  area,  Rangpur  experiences  annual  famines  that  lead  to  seasonal  declines  in 
household income and consumption. A key coping strategy for households in the face of the 
famine is internal labor migration to other parts of Bangladesh that are less- or unaffected by the 
famine.  The  experiment  involves  100  Rangpur  villages  that  were  randomly  allocated  to  the 
following experimental conditions: a control group; a treatment group offered information on 
jobs available, typical wages, and the likelihood of finding migrant work in a set of migration 
destinations; and other treatment conditions that offered cash or credit to cover the initial fixed 
costs  of  migration.  The  experiment  was  implemented  in  2008  and  the  endline  survey  of 
households in the 100 migrant-origin villages were implemented in 2009. Preliminary results are 
revealing,  suggesting  that  the  information  treatments  had  no  effect  but  the  cash  and  credit 
interventions had substantial effects on migration both in the year they were offered as well as in 
the next  year’s famine season (when the cash/credit were no longer offered by the research 
project).  Treatments  that  had  effects  on  migration  also  led  to  substantial  increases  in 
consumption in migrant households. Should they hold up, the results provide evidence of the 
importance of credit constraints as a migration barrier, and also – intriguingly – suggest that 
policies providing a small incentive to migrate in an initial period can have persistent effects in 
future periods even after the incentives are removed. 
A field experiment seeking to shed light on barriers to international migration is being 
implemented  by  Beam,  McKenzie,  and  Yang  (2010)  in  Sorsogon  province,  the  Philippines. 
International labor migration from the Philippines is very large in magnitude: the Philippine 
Overseas Employment Agency, with which all overseas labor contracts of Filipinos must be 
officially registered, has recorded over one million new contracts per year since 2006. Roughly 
one-third of this number are ―new hires‖ or first deployments overseas, and the remaining two-
thirds are ―rehires‖ or new work contracts for workers who are already overseas or who have 
previously been overseas. Within the country, international labor migration rates are highest in 
areas  closest  to  major  cities  like  Manila  (the  capital)  and  Cebu.  An  open  question  is  why 
individuals in some outlying provinces – such as Sorsogon, which is more than 12 hours by bus 
from the capital – typically have substantially lower rates of international labor migration despite 
facing larger income gaps between home and abroad.  
The baseline survey and intervention for the Sorsogon experiment was completed in mid-
2010, with roughly 5,000 households in the sample. Randomization was at the household level. 
The experimental conditions were as follows: a control group; a group offered information on 
typical wages in common overseas work destinations, on procedures for applying for overseas 
work, and on the typical fixed costs involved in overseas labor migration; and a group offered 
assistance in applying for overseas work (in addition to the information offered to the previous 
treatment group). Households in the ―assistance‖ treatment were offered access to and assistance 
with uploading information on themselves into a job-seekers’ website that recruitment agencies 
in Manila could then use to search for suitable candidates to fill overseas job openings. These 
interventions are intended to test the relative importance of various types of information and 
transactions costs in explaining the low incidence of international labor migration from outlying 
areas of the Philippines. 
Among the sample of individuals are enrolled in the job-seekers’ website database, a 
follow-on  randomization  will  be  implemented,  in  collaboration  with  a  local  microfinance 15 
 
institution, intended to shed light on the importance of credit constraints as a migration barrier. 
Prospective migrants in the database will be randomly allocated into the following groups: a 
group offered a small loan to cover the costs of job search (mainly costs of travel to and lodging 
in Manila to attend job interviews); a group offered a larger loan to cover costs of travel overseas 
once a job offer is obtained; a group offered both types of loans; and a control group offered no 
loan products. Estimated effects of these loan treatments should reveal the relative importance of 
credit constraints at two different stages of the international labor migration process (initial job 
search vs. overseas travel once a job offer is obtained).  
 
4. Conclusions and Lessons for Future Work 
  The decision of whether or not to migrate has far-reaching consequences for the lives of 
individuals and their families. But the very nature of this choice makes identifying the impacts of 
migration difficult, since it is hard to measure a credible counterfactual of what the person and 
their  household  would  have  been  doing  had  migration  not  occurred.  Migration  experiments 
provide a clear and credible way for identifying this counterfactual, and thereby allowing causal 
estimation  of  the  impacts  of  migration.  Yet  to  date  there  have  been  relatively  few  such 
experiments,  and  we  believe  there  are  large  gains  from  policymakers  and  researchers  using 
experiments more frequently. 
  On the policy side, Governments could use experiments more as a way of learning about 
the effectiveness of their policy initiatives. We have seen examples where migration lotteries 
have  been  used  as  a  fair  and  equitable  way  of  deciding  among  excess  demand  for  quota-
constrained immigration categories. A second natural place for such experiments is in piloting 
the introduction of new policies. For example, seasonal worker programs (such as those recently 
introduced  by  New  Zealand  and  Australia)  are  seen  as  a  way  to  enable  less-educated  poor 
households to reap some of the gains possible with international migration. Yet there is debate 
about the optimal way to select such workers, and about the extent to which it will actually 
benefit sending communities. Randomly selecting among eligible workers in the pilot phase, and 
experimenting with different recruitment mechanisms would provide a way for the design of 
such policies to be fine-tuned, alleviate potential concerns about political favoritism determining 
which individuals and villages participate, and provide a means for the development impacts to 
be identified. On the sending country side, several developing countries have shown interest in 
providing  pre-migration  orientation  seminars  for  potential  migrants,  in  a  similar  way  to  the 
Philippines. But there is little evidence as to the effectiveness of such programs, or as to which 
components  really  matter.  Before  introducing  such  programs  on  a  large  scale,  Governments 
could experiment with offering different content to different groups of migrants, and measure 
which is most effective. 
  One argument Governments might muster against randomly choosing among applicants 
for a given migration quota is a belief that they can get higher quality migrants by intensive 
screening of all applications. This argument is likely to be more important for policies to admit 
skilled migrants. Points systems for migration provide one such approach to screening, in which 
prospective migrants are scored on a basis of marketable skills and desirable characteristics, with 
only  those  individuals  scoring  above  a  certain  threshold  eligible  to  migrate.  For  example, 
Australia’s points  system  in  scores  applicants  out  of 170 based on their age, English  skills, 
occupation, work experience, Australian qualifications, and other characteristics. The system had 16 
 
pass marks of 100 and 120 for different visa categories in 2010.
7 Whilst one can imagine the 
Government being reasonably confident that someone with a  score of 170 is a more desirable 
immigrant than someone with a score of 60, there is likely to be much more uncertainty about 
whether people getting a score of 95 are all that different from those getting a score of 105. 
Governments could therefore conside r randomizing among excess applications within some 
range around the pass mark, in order to learn more about the impacts of such policies.  This 
would be analogous to the approach used in some microfinance experiments, which have 
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